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ROLLING THE DICE ON THE CYBER-RESERVATION:
THE CONFLUENCE OF INTERNET GAMING AND
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
David B. Jordan*
In 1968, during an era of dramatically changing social and political values,
the United States ended the traumatic and devastating saga of the Native
Americans who had suffered through policies of removal, assimilation, and
outright termination, by passing the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights
Act was more than just a bill of personal rights, but a marked transformation
in the status of Indian tribes in the United States. The new era brought a
policy of self-determination, teaching the tribes not to assimilate, but to
become economically and politically independent. The following three
decades provided Indian tribes with economic development opportunities that
subsequently converted small poor settlements of Native Americans into
wealthy, powerful tribal communities. These tribal communities garnered the
real power of Indian law, tribal sovereignty, and used this doctrine as a
negotiating tool, an economic sword, and a judicial shield to provide
advantages and leverage to Native American tribes. The largest economic
dragon slain was that of the gambling industry. In 1996, gaming industry
revenues from Indian tribes alone topped $5.4 billion annually,' and in 1997
those estimates grew to $6.4 billion.'
The big gaming dollar for the tribes has only fueled the economic fire. A
brand-new industry in gaming, via the Internet, has exploded and now is
responsible for more than an estimated 200 gambling web sites throughout the
world.' Tribal economic development groups, in efforts to maintain tribal
social programs, minimize dependence on federal grant money, and provide
capital for other economic and government projects, are looking for new
opportunities to both increase consumer traffic and increase revenues. Internet
gaming provides at least an alternative.
*Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. This article was submitted for
course credit in May 1999.
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L Internet Gaming: A Brief Lesson
Internet gaming, at first perception, seems to the lay observer to be a
subject that is as broad as the Internet itself, jutting across local, state,
national, and international boundaries; imposing iniquitous values on the
cultures of societies across the world, spreading the seed of organized crime
far beyond the sheltered enclaves the "mafia" has receded to in recent
decades, and depleting communities of valuable dollars required to prop up
the declining welfare of the common citizen. However, Internet gaming is
actually a very narrow slice of the electronic gaming industry. Internet
gaming has come to be used to describe gambling activities that take place via
the Internet, or more narrowly, the World Wide Web and local access servers.
The common thread of Internet gaming is consumer access through personal
computers at remote locations, like home, for instance, and the connection of
those personal computers to a network that provides access to gaming.
Other types of electronic gaming include: any gaming that takes place
over traditional telephone lines; electronic slot machines located at popular
casinos across the country; networked keno, lottery, and bingo games that
span in size from local networks of players to nation wide electronic bingo
games; and pan-mutual and off-track betting parlors that link horse races
and horse race results by telephone, cable, or satellite from across the
country to facilitate wagering.
Scholars and legislators frequently address electronic gaming as a whole.
As legislators draft regulations addressing the Internet, they frequently
define it in such a way as to include other forms of electronic gaming.
Intentionally, or not, the inclusion shows the lack of understanding that the
legislatures and the courts have in determining exactly what the Internet
really is. Also, electronic gaming, by many, is regarded as bucking the
gambling system. Many believe that traditional gaming is not as destructive
as it could be to the welfare of our citizens because it requires an
affirmative, deliberate, and at times sluggish action to gamble. Electronic
gaming has brought incredible efficiency to the gambling industry. In the
time that a person at Harrah's can make a bet on the roulette wheel and wait
for the little ball to drop onto double zero, a person using an electronic
gaming device can make ten to twenty of the same bets. This efficiency
increases the risk to the consumer, and creates a distrust for the electronic
gaming industry.
A. Applicable Federal Statutes
Gaming in the United States, both as a business and a source of
recreation, dates back to the birth of our nation. Although primarily a field
of law left for the states, federal regulation of gaming has grown since
1903, when the Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce Clause allowed
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Congress to regulate intrastate gaming activities.4 Since 1906, Congress has
enacted several federal statutes to aid in the federal regulation of gaming
activities.
Currently, there is no Federal Law governing Internet gaming; however,
a myriad of other federal regulations exist that possibly impact Internet
gaming. The Gaming Devices Act of 1951, or more popularly known as the
Johnson Act, was enacted in 1951 to prohibit the interstate transportation
of gaming devices!
The Interstate Wire Act of 1961 prohibits the interstate transportation of
wagering information or wagers by wire. The Wire Act criminalizes those
engaged in the business of gambling, and not the gambler.6 The Wire Act
states that "whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive
money ... as a result of ... wagers, or for information assisting in the
placing of ... wagers, shall be fined ... or imprisoned ..... .The act
specifically excludes transmissions of information used in news reporting
of sporting events or contests! In addition, the act excludes the
transmission of information assisting in the placement of wagers from a
state or country where the sports betting or contest is legal. This exception
allows, for example, Nevada bookmakers to broadcast betting lines on
various sporting events. One particular concern of the statute is that
transmission has been defined by the Seventh Circuit as "sending" and not
"receiving."9 However, other circuits have determined that the section
embraces those involved in the reception of wagers as well as those
involved in sending wagers."
The Wire Act is the strongest weapon the Department of Justice has in
assaulting Internet gaming at present. However, the act was not tailored to
the Internet medium, and instead was drafted with telephone and telegraph
4. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 327 (1903).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 1171-1177 (1994); see also James H. Frey, Federal Involvement in U.S.
Gaming Regulations, 556 ANNAIS AM. AcAD. POL & Soc. Sci. 138, 142 (March 1998).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994); see also Frey, supra note 5, at 142.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994).
8. See id. § 1084(b).
9. See United States v. Stonehouse, 452 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1971); Telephone Sys., Inc. v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. 111. 1963), afd, 376 U.S. 782 (1964).
10. See United States v. Skalroff, 506 U.S. 837 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874
(1975); United States v. Tomeo, 459 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972); see also Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1966) (determining that a
person holding himself out as being in the business of betting, and does in fact accept offers of
bets, does violate the Wire Act).
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wires in mind. The circuit split concerning whether reception is sufficient
to impose criminal liability on a business engaged in betting is particularly
troublesome. In the Internet medium, the user actually contacts a site at a
different location and transmits information to that site. In the context of
gambling, bettors send bets, credit card numbers, addresses, etc. to these
gambling sites, and these passive sites never "interact" with the bettor.
Gaming operations can set up passive websites and avoid criminal liability,
at least in jurisdictions favoring the Seventh and Fifth Circuit opinions.
However, as with most legislative loopholes, courts are usually quick to
interpret in favor of the broad sweep of legislation. In the alternative,
Congress is usually swift in remedying judicial exceptions that criminals can
jump through.
Another interesting face of the Wire Act is the "interstate" requirement.
"Interstate" has been defined by courts as requiring only one interstate
phone call to meet the standard for criminal liability." However, within the
context of the Internet, a transmission could take place between both parties
within a state, and still the technology of the Internet could send the
transmission through servers that are an "interstate" wire communication
facility. In addition, the Wire Act never considered satellite technology,
where, there is never a use of wire communications. Conceivably, Joe from
Texas could send a satellite transmission containing wager information to
Bob in Hawaii, never use a wire communication facility, and never fall
under the purview of the Wire Act.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 sought to deter organized
crime by prohibiting gambling businesses that had a volume that exceeded
a particular amount. 2 The act specifically imposes Federal criminal
liability on those involved in illegal gambling businesses, that is, a gambling
business which violates a state law, involves five or more persons in the
business, and either remains in business for more than thirty days, or has
a gross revenue on anyone day of more than $2000." Primarily, this
statute simply provides a federal criminal action for activities that the state
would prosecute anyway.
The Amateur and Professional Sports Protection Act prohibits states
(including Indian tribes) from authorizing sports betting. 4 Congress
grandfathered in those states that already authorized legal sports betting."
11. See United States v. Swank, 441 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1971); see also United States v.
Kelley, 254 F. Supp. 9 (D.C.N.Y. 1966) (holding violation of this act can occur when defendant
uses interstate communication facility through another, even though other person is not engaged
in business of betting).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Frey, supra note 5, at 142.
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a), (b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
14. See 28 U.S.C §§ 3701-0374 (1994); see also Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law, The
Law of Internet Gaming 12 (1999) (on file with author).
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3704(a)(1), (2) (1994); see also Rose, supra note 14, at 14-15.
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This act essentially cut off the rapid growth of sports wagering throughout
the country, and limited that wagering to those states that had state laws
permitting such activity prior to the enactment of the act. In addition, the
act specifically applies to Indian tribes, as noted in section 3704(b)."6
The general lottery statutes at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1307 put both
prohibitions and restrictions on importation, shipping, or use of U.S. mails
for lottery material.'7
The most draconian of federal statutes is the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). This act converts state gambling
offenses into federal crimes when an organization has committed two
predicate crimes more than two years."8
B. Applicable State Statutes
Aside from the limited federal control over gambling, especially when
it involves interstate activity, regulation of gambling has primarily remained
the role of the state. States regulate gaming and prohibit gaming for a
variety of reasons. Those that choose to prohibit certain types of gaming
typically do so because of the moral composition of their communities.
However, gaming prohibition has also been driven by strong economic
considerations of both the state welfare systems, as well as traditional
gaming operations competing for the elusive disposable income of the
consumer. Studies of gaming activity in communities have attempted to
show conclusive links between gambling and a decline in quality of life
among the consumers. In addition, the powerful entertainment dollar
garnered by mega-industries, such as sporting events, recreational facilities,
and even legalized gaming itself, and fueled by pedantic lobbyists, operates
to pork barrel legislation prohibiting gambling.
Gaming regulation, as opposed to the prohibition of the same, is regarded
as somewhat of a different animal. Many states, giving into the tantalizing
appeal of the tax revenues that gaming can command, have set aside the
virtuous prohibition of gambling in favor of regulation that will balance the
state interests of revenue and control of organized crime, and the gaming
industries' interests of high profit margins and internal control.
Although Congress has not conclusively addressed the Internet gaming
issue as of yet, states have been regulating and prohibiting Internet gaming
for several years. This is not unpredicted. States have always had more at
stake in dealing with gambling then the federal government; especially as
it deals with crimes involved with gaming.
16. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3704(b) (1994).
17. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1307 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Rose, supra note 14, at
16.
18. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Rose, supra note 14, at
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In Nevada, for instance, the first explicit prohibition of Internet gaming -
and explicit exceptions - was passed in 1997.9 The law prohibited any
Internet operator from anywhere in the world from accepting bets or wagers
from any person within the State of Nevada." In addition, the law also
imposed criminal liability on the person in the State of Nevada placing the bet
or wager.2' In addition, the state extends criminal liability, as long as the
requisite element of knowledge exists, to online servers, such as America
Online2 Coincidentally, the statute expressly exempts from the foundational
elements of the criminal liability any wagers made to Nevada-licensed gaming
operations.' Presumably, Nevada could license gaming operations physically
located outside of the state (St. Thomas, for example) to both allow out-of-
staters to game on the Internet within Nevada. The statute did not address this
scenario, obviously because of the gaming lobby. The statute also permits
Nevada to sell state licenses for hefty sums to other states or even other
nations allowing gaming by Nevada residents to out-of-state gaming facilities.
In 1997, Louisiana outlawed gambling on a computer.' Gambling on a
computer was defined as "conducting as a business of any game, contest,
lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value
in order to realize a profit when accessing the Internet, World Web, or any
part thereof by way of any computer, computer system, computer network,
computer software, or any server."2 Louisiana also exempts from its laws
certain electronic poker machines used on river boats and pari-mutual racing,
which relies heavily on computers for transmission of race information from
the track to off-track betting parlors.'
Several states have made the pro-active choice to regulate cybergaming.
In Pennsylvania, off-track betting parlors for horse racing now allow wagers
to be accepted via a computerY In New York, off-track betting parlors have
already begun accepting online wagers for horse racing' In Oregon, the
state has allowed wagering through "electronic media" as long as the money
is deposited in advance.9 Maryland currently allows telephone wagering,
where courts have reluctantly extended this inclusion to other wire
communications, such as computers?
19. See Rose, supra note 14, at 21.
20. See iU; see also S. 318, 69th Legis. (Nev. 1997) (codified in NEe. REV. STAT. §§
465.091-465.094 (1997)).
21. See Rose, supra note 14, at 21; see also S. 318.
22. See Rose, supra note 14, at 21; see also S. 318.
23. See Rose, supra note 14, at 21; see also S. 318.
24. See Rose, supra note 14, at 21; see also LA. RE'. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (West 1997).
25. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3; see also Rose, supra note 14, at 21-22.
26. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3.
27. See Rose, supra note 14, at 24; see also 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 325.218(b) (1995).
28. See Rose, supra note 14, at 24; see also N.Y. RAC. PARI-M. § 1012 (McKinney 1998).
29. See Rose, supra note 14, at 25; see also OR. REv. STAT. § 462.142 (1998).




II. Federal Indian Law: The Basics
A. Tribal Sovereignty
Federal Indian law has its modem roots in the famous case of Worcester
v. Georgia,3 where Justice Marshall stated, in the most quoted of all
Supreme Court cases, "Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent, political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial .... ,,"z This
adoptive affirmation by the Supreme Court provided the basic framework by
which federal Indian law subsequently developed over the next 160 years.
The key element in federal Indian law is the recognition of tribal sovereignty
tempered with a guardian-ward relationship with the federal government. The
federal government has regarded Indian tribes as beyond the purview of state
control, yet squarely within the control of the federal government. However,
many traditional Euro-American values do not apply to Indian tribes. For
instance, in Talton v. Mayes,33 the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights
did not apply to Indian tribes.'4
This tribal sovereignty doctrine provides Indian tribes with a great deal of
leverage, as control by state laws is a rarity. In addition, Indian tribes,
although considered a political classification and not a cultural
classification," still benefit from a great deal of deference provided by the
conscience of Congress. Even over the last twenty years and the supposed
erosion of tribal sovereignty, the doctrine remains a powerful force in the
ability of Indian tribes to independently control their social, cultural, political,
and economic future.
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
One unique aspect of tribal sovereignty, and one quite applicable to the
area of gaming, is the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity
has long been regarded in modem jurisprudence as a defense for a sovereign
from suit. The literal interpretation, "the king could do no wrong," affords a
sovereign an opportunity to shield itself from actions brought by citizens or
nations, unless that sovereign expressly opened itself up for suit.
Tribal sovereign immunity was extended to Indian tribes, reflecting the
recognition of the Supreme Court as to Indian tribes as sovereigns. Although
its initial inception into Indian law is questionable, the doctrine has become
(1998).
31. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
32. Id. at 559.
33. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
34. Id. at 384.
35. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 (1974).
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firmly rooted and is now an incredibly valuable tool for Indian tribes as they
begin to flex their political and economic muscle. Most recently, the Supreme
Court ruled in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc.' that absent an express waiver by the tribes or Congress, Indian tribes
are immune from suit in both federal and state courts for activities of both
commercial and governmental nature that arise either on or off of Indian
land."
C. Indian Gaming: The Early Years
Federal Indian law began its real trek into gaming in 1987 when the
Supreme Court decided California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.S
The case involved the power of California to enforce a law prohibiting bingo
and poker games over the Mission Indians. 9 California was one of a few
limited states that were given express power from Congress to extend its
criminal jurisdiction to Indian land located within the territory of the state.
The Supreme Court held that the issue as to jurisdiction turned on whether the
law against bingo games was prohibitive in nature or regulative in nature.'
The Court held that only if the game was prohibitive may a Public Law 280
state~' restrict the ability of an Indian tribe to offer a similar game. The
distinction between prohibitive and regulative laws depends on the existence
of any state law allowing other types of gaming, such as church bingo, horse
races, and lotteries. The true threat of Cabazon was that almost all states
offered some form of gaming and would find that their gaming laws lacked
prohibitive or criminal effect. The result of Cabazon was that Indian gaming
exploded.
One interesting aspect of Cabazon is the Supreme Court held the tribes
were proper to offer gaming on Indian land to non-Indians. This unique
position should be analyzed as to a tribe's ability to extend Internet gaming
to non-Indians on or off of Indian land. Cabazon was a jurisdictional case,
and thus it would not be a stretch to believe that the permissibility of
participation of non-Indians in Indian gaming extended to their geographical
location on Indian land engaging in gaming activity.
As a result of the explosion of Indian gaming, and subsequent concern by
state legislatures and powerful Las Vegas and Atlantic City lobbying groups,
Congress passed in 1988 the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act4 The quick
36. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
37. Il at 759-60.
38. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
39. Il at 202.
40. Id.
41. This was the Public Law that extended criminal jurisdictions of states into Indian land.
Public Law 280 was limited to only a handful of states, and primarily had little or no effect on
gaming after Cabazon. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588.
42. WHLUAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NtrrsHm. 286 (1998).
43. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1166,25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994); See
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federal response to the Cabazon decision thwarted a multitude of looming
questions concerning the effect that Cabazon had on many of the other court
rulings and statutes, such as the Organized Crime Control Act.M
D. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) essentially divided gaming
activities into three classes. Class I gaming included social games for nominal
value or traditional Indian gaming activities associated with tribal
ceremonies.'5 Class I gaming represents those forms of gaming that have the
least impact on the economic and criminal concerns of the tribe, state, and the
United States. Consequently Class I gaming is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the tribe, and neither the state nor the federal governments have
any control of this gaming under IGRA. This concession by the United States
in IGRA, however, is of nominal value, because Class I serves very little
purpose to the economic and political engine of the Indian tribes.
Class II gaming includes card games not played against the "house," such
as some forms of poker, and bingo, "whether or not electronic, computer, or
other technologic aids are used"' and other similar games such as lotto, tip
jars, and pull tabs.47 Class II gaming is permitted to be licensed by the
Indian tribe for gaming on Indian land if the state permitted "such gaming.""
This language appears to be drawn from the rationale behind Cabazon. The
distinction between gaming allowed, as in Cabazon, is whether "such gaming"
was permitted in the state. However, much litigation has followed concerning
the meaning of "such gaming"; does "such gaming" mean the particular type
of gaming or the class of which the particular type of gaming is included?
Although a state cannot regulate Class II gaming, this class is subject to
regulation by the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC).4! ' The NIGC
has promulgated volumes of regulations concerning Class II gaming. Those
regulations include requirements for licensing and distribution of revenues.'
Class III gaming is defined as the residual of gambling activities outside
of the parameters of Class I and II gaming."s Class I gaming includes
house card games, including baccarat and blackjack; casino games, such as
roulette and craps; slot machines and electronic facsimiles of any game of
chance; and lotteries.' Class III gaming is only within the jurisdiction of an
also 134 CONG. REC. H8146-01 (1988).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also CANBY, supra note 42, at 286-87.
45. See CANBY, supra note 42, at 288; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1994).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (1994).
47. See CANBY, supra note 42, at 289; see also Class II Gaming, 25 C.F.R. § 502.3 (1992).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (1994).
49. See id. § 2704-2708; see also CANBY, supra note 42, at 289.
50. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 501-577 (1995).
51. See 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (1995).
52. See 25 C.F.R. § 502.4.
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Indian tribe when the tribe has entered into a tribal-state compact to permit
such gaming activity on Indian landY' These negotiated compacts include
provisions that address subjects such as criminal jurisdiction and revenue
distribution. IGRA, in its original form in 1988, allowed tribes, in conjunction
with the federal government, to force states to negotiate in good faith.'
However, the Supreme Court ruled in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida"
that 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)' unconstitutionally abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity from suit. IGRA, as it related to the
Indian tribes' assurance that the states would negotiate in good faith, lost the
statutory power it was intended to have when Congress drafted the statute.
III. Confluence of Internet Gaming & Federal Indian Law
A. Internet Gaming and the Class Distinction
Intemet gaming should first be considered as to placement in the IGRA
classification system. Internet gaming should not be automatically placed into
Class I1 gaming simply because a computerized system resembles "electronic
facsimiles of any game of chance," such as electronic slot machines. 8 The
real distinction of Internet gaming is not the type of game that takes place but
the location of the gaming activity. A quick review of the classification
system of gaming under IGRA highlights that distinctions are made between
the classes based on value, such as the inclusion of social games of nominal
value within the Class I category. Distinctions are also made between classes
based on house take, such as the distinction between non-bank card games
(poker) in Class II gaming and bank card games (blackjack) in Class III
gaming.
However, court decisions have added another distinction to the
classification system. The courts have generally held that the provision in
section 2703(8) regulating Class I gaming moves all "electronic
facsimiles" 9 of games of chance from Class I to Class I. This language
seems on its face to contradict the language in section 2703(7) which includes
in Class II gaming "the game of chance commonly known as bingo . . .
whether or not electronic, computer, or other technologic aids are
used. .. ."' 25 C.F.R. §§ 502.7-502.8 attempt to clear up this ambiguity.
53. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1994).
54. See id. § 2710(d)(3)(A) ("mhe State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith
to enter into such a compact.").
55. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
56. This provision essentially authorized the tribe to bring a cause of action against the State
for failus to negotiate in good faith.
57. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 60.
58. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1994).
59. Id.




Section 502.7 defines "electronic, computer or other technologic aid" as not
a game of chance, but merely an aid to assist a player or the playing of a
game and is "readily distinguishable from the playing of a game of chance on
an electronic or electromechanical facsimile ... ."6 Section 502.8 defines
"electronic or electromechanical facsimile as any device described in 15
U.S.C. § 1171 (a)(2) or (b)"' stating:
(2) machine or mechanical device (including, but not limited to,
roulette wheels and similar devices) designed and manufactured
primarily for use in connection with gambling, and (A) which
when operated may deliver, as the result of the application of an
element of chance, any money or property, or (B) by the
operation of which a person may become entitled to receive, as
the result of the application of an element of chance, any money
or property ....
The distinction has been litigated often, including recently in Diamond Game
Enterprises, Inc. v. Reno where the court held that the distinction between
electronic aid and electronic facsimile is that the electronic aid "must operate
to broaden the participation levels of participants in a common game."' The
court also held an electronic aid "is distinguishable from a 'facsimile' in which
a single participant plays with or against a machine rather than with or against
other players. ' The second element concerning whether the aid and the
facsimile are distinguishable takes into account whether the player perceives
that they are playing a computer or a group of people.' The Diamond court
discussing the legislative intent, stated that the drafters envisioned electronic
aid to allow for tribes to broaden participation throughout either the local
gaming site, or among other tribes through use of cable, telephone lines, or
satellite.'
This leaves open the possibility that Indian tribes could operate gaming
operations over the Internet, with the intent to broaden participation as long
as the game is not played against a computer but against other participants,
and the player is aware that they are playing against other participants instead
of a computer. The game played over the Internet could be any outlined in
Class II gaming that meets the foundational requirements,' such a poker or
bingo. The result of the Class I classification is that the Indian tribe is no
61. 25 C.F.R. § 502.7 (1998).
62. 25 C.F.R. § 502.8 (1998).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a)(2), (3) (1994).
64. 9 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 1998).
65. Id. at 19-20.
66. Id.
67. Md. at 21.
68. Id. at 20.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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longer required to form a tribal-state compact. Class I gaming operations
afford Indian tribes additional economic and political independence because
the state is no longer an influence in the management and regulation of the
gaming activity.
B. Inter7zet Gaming: The Search for the Location
Critical in the concept of Internet gaming is determining where the gaming
is taking place. As a beginning point, IGRA only extends the boundaries for
permissible Indian gaming operations to the borders of Indian land." The
logical extension to this foundation is that Indian gaming is not permitted off
of Indian land. However, Internet gaming provides a problematic
determination for courts and legislatures. Does the Internet gaming take place
at the location of the server, where the networks connect and the actual wager
is taken? Does the Internet gaming take place at the geographical location of
the player, who through a device, such as a personal computer, places a bet
by dialing into a network? This distinction has provided legal dilemmas for
courts determining other Internet issues, including criminal and civil
jurisdiction, domicile, international law and federal interstate laws. In many
situations, courts are forced to apply, by analogy, statutes addressing areas of
law dissimilar to Internet gaming. The District Court of Idaho recently ruled
in AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe? that, when a wager is place by
telephone from off of a reservation, an Internet lottery is not on Indian land.
This dcctrine runs parallel to the reasoning within the Interstate Wire Act,
stating that gaming must be legal in the state from which the phone call is
made 2 If Indian tribes cannot shake the doctrine that Internet gaming takes
place at the location of the bettor, the opportunities for expansive
computerized gaming will be limited. The reasoning in the AT&T case was
that if tribes offer Internet lotteries to states across the country, then not only
do tribes need to compact with the state from which they originate, but also
with each state the lottery reaches. The legal workload of such an undertaking
would certainly exceed the resulting growth in revenue potential for Indian
tribes, and seems to be an implausible alternative.
The multistate compacting concerns could be modified in two other ways.
The Indian tribes could block access on the Internet sites by filtering out
players that were not located geographically in states that allowed Internet
gaming. This filtering technology is not without its limitations, and is easily
circumvented. Courts might find that Indian tribes circumvented the filters
and continued to offer, negligently, Internet gaming to states with a
prohibition on Internet gaming. The other alternative is to simply engage in
multistate compacting, but on a limited scale. Section 2710(d) of IGRA
70. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a),(b) & (d) (1994).
71. 45 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1001 (D. Idaho 1998).
72. See Rose, supra note 14, at 26; see also Interstate Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994).
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authorizes gaming if "located in a State that permits such gaming. ' If the
previous doctrine of Internet gaming laid out in AT&T were to remain intact,
gaming takes place at the bettor's location and not at the location of the server
or network. It is interesting to note that if the doctrine were to change, and
Internet gaming actually takes place on Indian land, then under section
2710(d) there would be no need for multistate compacting.
C. The Confluence and the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
An important segue at this point is the recent tribulations of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho. The Coeur d'Alene began a nationwide lottery in early
1998 that was offered to thirty-six states that had legalized lotteries.74 Under
the basic philosophy of IGRA, the tribe believed that if a compact was created
with Idaho that would allow Class III lottery gaming to take place on the Coeur
d'Alene reservation, then the tribe could offer such gaming to any state that
allowed "such gaming."75 This rationale failed to impress the Eighth Circuit.
In Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe76 the court impliedly directed the district court
to find Internet gaming is conducted on non-Indian land, and thus not preempted
by IGRA.7 The Coeur d'Alene tribe was also involved in the AT&T case
discussed supra, where the court held that the Interstate Wire Act allowed
AT&T to discontinue service to support the nationwide tribal lottery when the
district court found that Indian gaming was taking place on non-Indian land.7
Although the lottery site was operated at <www.uslottery.com>, the site has
subsequently been shutdown as of January 1999 until a ruling can be made at
the district court level.
D. The Confluence and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe
A similar alternative is being sported by the St. Regis Mohawk tribe of
New York. Recently, news sources reported that the St. Regis tribe begun the
process of developing Internet gaming by hiring an Internet development
company to build the software and hardware package needed to support an
Internet gaming system. The St. Regis tribe is currently under a tribal-state
compact for Class IT gaming, which includes keno, blackjack, bingo, and
pull-tabs. The tribe believes that the Coeur d'Alene problems have been
circumvented because:
73. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994).
74. Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1999).
75. Id. at 1109.
76. 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999).
77. Id at 1109. The Nixon Court ultimately believed that the decision as to whether Indian
gaming occurred on or off reservation was a matter for the trier of fact, but strongly stated that
the determination of whether that gaming occurred on or off Indian land was determinative of the
power of IGRA to preempt the gaming activity. Id. at 1108.
78. AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 45 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1001 (D. Idaho 1998).
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(1) The Interstate Wire Act is thwarted because the bettors would be from
the State of New York, where, according to the tribe, the transmission of
gaming information is legal because NY specifically permits off-track betting
and the purchase of lottery tickets by electronic transmission of gaming
information.
(2) The tribe is protected from a state injunction, under the theory that the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over tribal gaming.'
(3) Additionally, the tribe is immune from suit unless a specific violation
of the compact is plead."1
However, the St. Regis tribe must still deal with the problem of placing
geographic filters on the interactive web site, so as to not suffer the same fate
as the Coeur d'Alene tribe. Although the St. Regis web site has been reported
to be under development, Thomas Cook, a member of the St. Regis Mohawk
tribal gaming commission denies that the tribe itself has undertaken any
preparation for an Internet gaming site.'
E. Internet Gambling Prohibition Act: The Future of Internet Gaming
On March 23, 1999, Sen. Jon Kyl (R.-Ariz.) introduced an amendment to
the Interstate Wire Act, Senate Bill 692, the Internet Gambling Prohibition
Act" to prohibit Internet gaming.' Kyl had unsuccessfully sponsored a
similar bill in the 105th Congress, in which the Senate passed the Act in a 90-
10 vote, yet died in the House at the end of the term.s Senate Bill 692
includes language that states "it shall be unlawful for a person engaged in a
gambling business to use the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.. . to place [or] receive a... bet or wager .... "' However, the
Internet Gambling Prohibition Act contains some convenient exceptions.
Those exceptions include: intrastate lotteries; multi-state lotteries using a
"private network"; any wagers based on horse racing, as long as a closed-loop
subscriber-based service is used, and wagering on horse races is legal in that
state; and fantasy sports games or contests." The bill, as amended (Senate
Bill 2782), passed the Senate by unanimous consent in November 1999, and
is currently before the House Judiciary Committee.'




82. Telephone Interview with Thomas Cook, Member, Gaming Commission, St. Regis
Mohawk Tribe (May 6, 1999).
83. See S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
84. 145 CONG. REC. 3123-02, 3144 (1999).
85. See Debra Baker, Betting on Cyberspace, ABA JOURNAL, Mar. 1999, at 54.
86. S. 692, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (1999).
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The proposed Act was amended on the same day it passed by an
amendment introduced by Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R.-Colo.) providing
language addressing many of the concerns of Indian tribes." The amendment
essentially sheltered electronic Indian gaming from the effects of IGRA. 0
The amendment provided that IGRA "does not apply to any otherwise lawful
bet or wager that is placed, received, or otherwise made on any game that
constitutes class II gaming or class III gaming, or the sending, receiving, or
inviting of information assisting in the placing of any such bet or wager.""
However, the amendment compromised a position that Indian tribes, including
the Coeur D' Alene, argued; that physical presence is not expressly required
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and hence should not be required
for otherwise legal Indian gaming operations. The amendment states that each
person placing or receiving the bet, or transmitting the betting information
must be "physically located on Indian lands" and that the game must be
"conducted on a closed-loop subscriber-based system or a private network"'
The amendment also requires that tribal-state compacts must include
references to use of the Internet or interactive computer service on a closed-
loop subscriber-based system or private network.93
The language of the amendment within the Kyl bill seems to foreclose any
opportunities that Indian tribes have to extend tribal gaming outside of the
geographic borders of the respective Indian land. This bill would then
preclude operations such as the <www.uslottery.com> site developed by the
Coeur D'Alene, who attempted to allow for non-Indian land access to an
Indian lottery located in Washington state. However, the bill does not seem
to disturb operations like Megabingo that connect dozens of Indian gaming
sites across the country in a "national bingo," simply because all the
participants, as well as the gaming providers, are located on Indian land. The
bill has yet to become law, however, its unanimous passage in the Senate
seems to be an omen for the future of Internet gaming.
Conclusion
There are still a few questions to be pondered for tribes, and their inclusion
in the end of this article should provide a spark for future inquiry into the
nebulous area of Internet Indian gaming. Can tribes solicit non-U.S. citizens
to participate in Internet gaming activities? Is the Internet bettor really gaming
as of publication.
89. See id.
90. See 145 CONG. REc. 14865 (1999) (amending S. 692).
91. S. 692 § 2(f)(4)(A).
92. Id, § 2(f)C4)(A)(ii).
93. Il § 2(f)(4)(A)(iv)(l).
94. less Green, Indian Gaming 1998, in SOVEREIGNTY SYMPOSIUM XI: IN THE SERVICE OF
THE LAW 36 (1998).
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off-reservation while on their personal computer at home or on-reservation
where the server is located? Is Class II Internet gaming fair game for tribes
or also excluded by the proposed Internet Gambling Prohibition Act?
Many questions remain, and as a result, the sovereign Indian nations can
and will continue to push the Internet gaming envelope. The bureaucratic
federal government should take the time to answer the theoretical questions
that exist in the blurry areas between Internet gaming law and Indian law.
Barring he passage of the Kyl bill, tribes should continue to experiment with
electronic aids in promoting Indian gaming on the reservation through the use
of the Internet. Tribes can take advantage not only of the ability to compact
with states, but also the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The National
Gaming Impact Commission itself admitted in its lengthy 1999 report that
dozens of questions still exist as to the proper application of Internet gaming
to the tribal setting. Until the questions to these questions are clear, tribes
should continue to develop and implement new and creative ways to deliver
legal Indian gaming to capitalize on a public eager to spend money to
reinforce the self-determination goals of Indian tribes as supported by the
United States.
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